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Presidents, Vice Presidents, and
Death: Closing the Constitution's
Succession Gap
Akhil Reed Amar*
Death and taxes are taboo. Talk about taxes is bad
'politics, and talk about death is bad form. But for the sake
of our children and grandchildren, if not ourselves, we must
talk about, and sometimes must raise, taxes. And we must
also talk-and talk now-about death and Presidential suc-
cession. Our current legal regime is a constitutional acci-
dent waiting to happen-a future crisis that is both
thoroughly predictable and easily avoidable through ordi-
nary, nonpartisan legislation that can be enacted now, long
before any crisis arises. In this essay, I shall sketch out
what I see as the problem, and the nonpartisan legislative
solution I envision.
I. THE PROBLEM
It would probably surprise most thoughtful Americans,
even those familiar with our Constitution, to learn that ma-
jor glitches exist in our scheme of Presidential succession.
To detect these gaps, we must carefully examine the Consti-
tution's provisions.
The original Constitution, in Article II, provides that in
the event of the President's "Removal, ... Death, Resigna-
tion, or Inability" the "Powers and Duties" of the President
"shall devolve on the Vice President," whose election is
provided for earlier in Article II. That Article goes on to
empower Congress "by Law" to enact succession rules in
the event of "Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability" of
both the President and Vice President. (Congress has done
so in 3 U.S.c. § 19, the Presidential Succession Act.)
* Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. This essay was originally prepared
and submitted as testimony before the Senate judiciary Subcommittee on the Con-
stitution on February 2, 1994.
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Later constitutional amendments refine this succession
scheme. After political parties emerged in the Presidential
elections of 1796 and 1800, Americans in 1804 adopted the
Twelfth Amendment, which modifies the rules for electing
Presidents and Vice Presidents in order to make it easier
for a party to run a PresidentiallVice Presidential "ticket."
Although the Twelfth Amendment nowhere requires
Americans to elect a unified party "ticket,"! it does enable
them to do so more easily. In the process, the 1Welfth
Amendment arguably also eases the process of Presidential
succession. In the typical case, a President who dies in of-
fice will be succeeded by his own "running mate"-a per-
son whom the President himself chose as his would-be
successor, and whom the American electorate embraced as
such.
In 1933, the Twentieth Amendment tried to smooth
out additional succession wrinkles. Section 3 of the
Amendment addresses a question not explicitly addressed
by Article II: What happens if, say, the day before Inaugu-
ration, the "President elect" dies? Section 3 provides that
in this case, "the Vice President elect shall become Presi-
dent" on Inauguration Day. Section 4 of the Amendment
deals with another wrinkle, enabling Congress "by law" to
provide for "the case of the death" of a leading Presidential
or Vice Presidential candidate in the rare situation where
no candidate has a clear electoral college majority, and
where, ordinarily, the election would be thrown into the
House or Senate. .
Still further refinements appear in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, proposed and ratified after President Ken-
nedy's assassination. Sections 1 and 3 clarify the principles
underlying the original Constitution's Article II. Section 1
makes clear that in the event of a President's removal,
death, or resignation, the Vice President not only assumes
the powers and duties of the Presidency, but does indeed
"become President." Section 3 spells out elaborate proce-
dures for determining the existence and duration of P~es~-
1. For more discussion of this point. see Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar~ Pres-
ident Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 918-24 (1992). .
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dential "Inability"-an altogether too cryptic term in
Article II. When these procedures are satisfied, the Vice
President assumes Presidential powers and duties as "Act-
ing President" during the period of the (formal) President's
inability. Section 2 of the 1\venty-Fifth Amendment can be
seen as extending the practical effect of the 1\velfth
Amendment. In the event of "a vacancy in the office of the
Vice President"-a vacancy typically created by the Vice
President's death, resignation, or removal (as in the case of
Spiro Agnew) or accession to the Presidency (as in the case
of Lyndon Johnson)-the President shall, subject to con-
gressional approval, name a Vice President to fill the va-
cancy. Like the Twelfth Amendment, this Section typically
enables a President to pick his own would-be successor,
subject to democratic approval of that successor.
It might at first seem that the Constitution's compre-
hensive provisions concerning Presidential succession,
spanning three centuries, and four discrete rounds of consti-
tutional text, would cover all contingencies, or at least, all
the big, easily foreseeable ones. But look again. What hap-
pens if, God forbid, the person who wins the general elec-
tion in November and the electoral college tally in
December dies before the electoral college votes are offi-
cially counted in Congress in January? If the decedent can
be considered "the President elect" within the meaning of
the Twentieth Amendment, then the rules would be clear,
but it is not self-evident that a person who dies before the
officiill counting of electoral votes in Congress is formally
the "President elect." Both Article II and the Twelfth
Amendment seem to focus on the formal counting of votes
in the Congress as the magic, formal moment of vesting in
which the winning candidate is elected as "President."2
Although the legislative history of the Twentieth Amend-
ment suggests that the electoral college winner is "Presi-
dent elect" the moment the eIectoral college votes are cast,3
" 2. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 ("The President of the Senate shall, in the
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and
the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes
.shqiz be.the President . ...")(emphasis added); id. at amend. XII (similar).
3. H.R. REP. No. 345, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. at 4-6 (February 2, 1932).
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and before they are counted in Congress, the text of the
Amendment fails to say this explicitly. In the absence of
such explicit language, some might argue that the formal
vesting rules of Article II and the Twelfth Amendment re-
main in effect, and that the Twentieth Amendment term
"President elect" does not apply to death prior to formal
vote-counting in Congress. (So too, the argument might
run, the legislative history of the Twentieth Amendment
plainly says that electoral votes will be counted in, and elec-
toral college deadlocks will be resolved by, the incoming
Congress, rather than the lame duck Congress;4 however,
the text of the Amendment does not explicitly require this.)
Far greater-indeed, horrific-uncertainty hangs over
earlier stages of the election process. What happens if, God
forbid, the person who clearly wins both the popular and de
facto electoral vote on Election Day in November, dies sud-
denly, the day before the electoral college formally meets
and votes in December? What is a faithful elector to do
here? If she votes for the decedent, will this vote even be
counted by the Congress? In the 1872 election, Congress
decided not to count the three electoral votes for Presiden-
tial candidate Horace Greeley, who had died after the No-
vember election but before the meeting of the electoral
college. The language of the Twentieth Amendment re-
quires an awful lot of stretching to reach the case at hand.5
In everyday expression, we refer to the winner of the N0-
vember election as the "President elect" even on Election
Night, with the informal vesting moment hovering between
television network proclamations of victory, concession
speeches by the opponent, and the victory speech by the
winner. But formally, under the Constitution, surely the
victor is not the "President elect" until-at least-the elec-
toral college has met and voted.6
Again, what is a faithful elector to do? If she votes for
the decedent, can she be certain that her vote will be
counted? If her vote, and the votes of other faithful elec-
4. [d. at 2, 3.
5. Indeed, the legislative history of the Amendment pointedly declined to re-
pudiate the Greeley precedent. See H.R. REP. No. 345, supra note 3, at 5.
6. See id. at 6.
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tors are not counted, then perhaps the other party's Presi-
dential candidate-the loser in November-would become
President. This scenario is especially imaginable if the
other party controls both House and Senate. Such control
might enable the other party to ignore the electoral votes
for the decedent, cynically but plausibly pointing to the
Greeley precedent. The other party could then proceed to
elect the November loser President either under the provi-
sions of the Twelfth Amendment, or (stretching things) via
a "law" passed-in January!-under Section 4 of the Twen-
tieth Amendment. (The possibility of different outcomes
under these two mechanisms-owing to their different vot-
ing rules-only adds to interpretive unhappiness as we try
to figure out the Constitution's rules here.)
Fearing these scenarios, suppose our faithful elector
decides to do rough justice by voting for her party's Vice
Presidential candidate as President. But this scheme will
work only if the other electors, in other states, do likewise.
Yet there is, by hypothesis, almost no time to coordinate
any voting strategy where the November winner dies unex-
pectedly hours before fifty-one groups of electors meet in
fifty-one different places on the same day, and must vote on
that day. Nor is it clear that state law would allow such
rough justice substitution, for some states· purport to bind
electors to vote for the November winner of their state
election. Though the constitutionality of such laws seems
highly dubious if we consult constitutional text, history, and
structure, the Supreme Court came close to approving such
laws in a brief opinion in a 1952 case, Ray v. Blair.7 (Here
is yet another source of uncertainty.) Finally, any rough
justice substitution might create a Vice Presidential vacuum
for faithful electors. It would be awkward, to say the least,
to vote for the same person for both President and Vice
President-and clearly unconstitutional to do so, under the
Twelfth Amendment, for electors from that candidate's
7. 343 U.s. 214 (1952). Ray approved Alabama's enforcement of a Demo-
cratic'Party rule that electoral colIege candidates must pledge to support the party
nominee as a condition of being listed on a primary balIot. Though the Court brack-
eted the issue, 343 U.S. at 223 n.10, its logic would seem to alIow state enforcement
of a similar party pledge rule in the November general election.
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home state.S Thus, even if rough justice substitution could
be quickly coordinated by faithful electors, and upheld
under constitutionally dubious state laws, it might enable
the other party to win the Vice Presidency undeservedly,
perhaps after various congressional shenanigans under the
Twelfth and Twentieth Amendments.
Now, finally, consider the horrible uncertainty hanging
over a hypothetical tragedy occurring even earlier in the
process. What happens if, God forbid, the candidate lead-
ing in all the polls suddenly drops dead on the first Monday
in November, hours before Election Day-after a handful
have already cast absentee ballots, but before the vast ma-
jority have voted? What is an informed voter going to the
polls on Election Day to do? Will her vote for someone
whom she (and everyone else) knows is already dead even
be counted by state election officials on Election Night? Or
by the electoral college in December? Or by Congress in
January? What if our informed voter tries to do rough jus-
tice by writing in her party's Vice Presidential candidate for
President? Would this vote be counted? (In some states, it
is not entirely clear whether one can write in candidates
whose names already appear on printed ballots.9) And
what about the "Vice Presidential vacuum" problem cre-
ated by this rough justice substitution? In many states,
votes are apparently counted by "ticket" rather than by
Presidential candidate; crazy as it sounds, a candidate re-
ceiving fifty-one percent of the overall vote for President
would apparently lose in many states unless those who
voted for this new Presidential candidate (Jones) also all
voted for the same running mate (Green).l0 And remem-
ber that, once again, there· is-by hypothesis-virtually no
8. u.s. CONST. amend. XII ("The Electors shall meet in their respective states,
and vote by ballot for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not
be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves.").
9. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 926.
10. Concretely: assume 30% of the voters vote for Jones for President and for
Green for Vice President; 30% vote for Jones (President) and Blue (Vice President);
and 40% vote for Black for President and White for Vice President. Under, the
voting rules of most if not all states, Black-not Jones-would win the state's electo-
ral votes. For the Black/White "ticket" received more votes than any other·'~ticket,"
and states apparently count votes by "ticket." For more elaboration of thispractii:e,
see Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 926-27; for criticism, see id. passim.· ".'.' ,','
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time for our informed voter to coordinate her strategy with
other like-minded voters.
In short, our seemingly comprehensive succession
scheme, spanning three centuries and four drafting efforts,
has some major gaps. It will not do to shrug our shoulders
with indifference and airily proclaim that the doomsday sce-
narios I have conjured up are unlikely to occur. Earth-
quakes are also unlikely, but sensible architects design
buildings to withstand these rare events, and sensible plan-
ners lay down emergency routines before the ground
shakes.
Nor should we play Pangloss and try, squint-eyed, to
read sheer sloppiness as hidden wisdom by saying, "perhaps
a little uncertainty is a good, or at least acceptable, thing.
Succession rules that are too certain, too predictable, are
perhaps unfortunate, providing would-be assassins too clear
notice of the likely consequences of their successful inter-
vention in history. We cannot always specify in advance
whose accession to the Presidency would be the most sensi-
ble, and so we should decide case by case, after the fact, all
things considered." Thus saith Pangloss. But our entire
constitutional structure plainly says otherwise. Uncer-
tainty, especially over so vital an issue as Presidential suc-
cession, is not, on balance, a virtue. Again and again, our
Constitution has tried to lay down clear rules about the
matter-and, where it is silent, our Constitution, on at least
three occasions,l1 has explicitly invited Congress to lay
down clear succession rules in advance of a crisis. The gaps
we have seen are genuine glitches in our Constitution's
structure, not mysterious embodiments of it.
.11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cI. 6 ("the Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice
_Rresident."); id. at amend. XX, § 4 ("The Congress may by law provide for the case
of. ilie death of any persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a
President whenever the choice shall have devolved upon them ...."); id. at amend.
X~V, -§ 4 ("Congress may by law provide" certain mechanisms for determining
Presidential inability.).
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II. THE SOLUTION
There is, in short, a time bomb ticking away in our
Constitution, and the time to defuse it is now, before any-
one gets hurt. Happily, the solution can take the form of an
ordinary, nonpartisan piece of congressional legislation.
We need not clutter up the Constitution with yet a fifth at-
tempt at ironing out Presidential succession wrinkles.
There is no need to crank up the elaborate machinery of
Article V supermajorities at both federal and state levels.
If, despite our best efforts, future glitches arise-and the
Constitution's track record on the succession issue counsels
humility in our ability to foresee all contingencies-a legis-
lative solution today may make it easier to improve on the
scheme by later ordinary legislation instead of yet another
(sixth!) effort at constitutional drafting. Finally, an ordinary
legislative solution is deeply in keeping with the Constitu-
tion's repeated invitations to Congress to regulate issues of
Presidential succession;12 with Congress's unique role in of-
ficially counting Presidential electoral votes in a magic mo-
ment of formal vesting;13 and with the legislative scheme
Congress has already enacted concerning Presidential
elections.14 .
My proposed legislation is wonderfully simple. In ad-
dition to its provisions in §§ 15-18 of Title 3 of the United
States Code, Congress should provide by statute that an
electoral vote for any person who is dead at the time of the
congressional counting is a valid vote, and will be counted,
so long as the death occurred on or after Election Day.
Modifying § 1 of Title 3,15 Congress should further provide
that, if one of the major parties presidential or vice presi-
dential candidates dies or becomes incapacitated shortly
before Election Day, (as certified by, say, the Chief Justice
12. See supra note 11.
13. See supra note 2; cf. text at notes 3-4.
14. See generally 3 U.S.c. §§ 1-18 (1988).
15. That section now reads as follows: "The electors of President and Vice.Pres-
ident shall be appointed, in each State, on the Thesday next after the first Monday in
November, in every fourth year succeeding every election of a President and Vice
President." 3 U.S.c. § 1 (1988).
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of the United States16) the Presidential election should be
postponed for up to, say, four weeks. Similarly, the death
or incapacity of a major candidate on the eve of the meet-
ing of the electoral college should trigger a one week post-
ponement of the meeting day set forth in § 7 of Title 3,17
In the remainder of this essay, I shall explain how and
why my proposed legislation would solve the problems
identified earlier.
The intuition underlying the proposal is simple: Presi-
dential succession rules for the period between Election
Day and Inauguration should track, as closely as possible,
the succession rules that would be in operation after Inau-
guration Day. Twenty-four hours after Inauguration, if,
God forbid, the President dies, his (typically hand-picked)
Vice President takes over, and she in turn names a new
Vice President, subject to congressional approval. If, God
forbid, the death occurs instead twenty-four hours before
Inauguration, a similar succession should occur on Inaugu-
ration Day. The new Vice President should be sworn in as
President on Inauguration Day and then name her succes-
sor. That, I take it, is the clear command and intuition of
the Twentieth Amendment's Section 3. And here is my
constitutional and commonsensical intuition: a similar suc-
cession should occur, if, God forbid, the death at the top of
the ticket occurs not twenty-four hours before Inauguration
Day but any time after Election Day.
16. My nomination of the Chief Justice is hardly critical to my overall legisla-
tive proposal-perhaps the head of the Federal Election Commission would be a
better choice. The Constitution, however, already gives the Chief Justice a special
role, presiding at Presidential impeachment trials under Article I, § 3, suggesting a
large measure of confidence in the Chief Justice's probity, independence, fairness,
and good sense in constitutionally delicate issues concerning the President. (Con-
sider also the role played by Chief Justice Earl Warren as head of the Commission
investigating President Kennedy's death.) Constitutional structure and tradition do
suggest some limits on the exercise of nonjudicial functions by sitting judges. See
Steven G. Calabresi and Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of
Powers or Separation ofPersonnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1994). Certification
of facts, however, does not seem terribly nonjudicial, or, indeed, very different from
the current role of Article III judges in naturalization proceedings.
. '17. That section now reads, in relevant part: "The electors of President and
Vic.e President of each State shall meet and give their votes on the first Monday
after the second Wednesday in December next following their appointment ...." 3
U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
HeinOnline -- 48 Ark. L. Rev.  224 1995
224 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:215
To put the point differently, the Twentieth Amend-
ment's spirit is best vindicated by treating its concept of
"President elect" realistically, not formalistically. The strict
words of the Amendment apply only after the electoral col-
lege has cast its votes and given a candidate a majority or
(stricter still) only after the Congress has counted the elec-
toral votes.18 But the reality today is that a President elect
is elected on Election Night, by the People, and not by elec-
tors in colleges meeting later, or by Congress counting
votes still later. Once the People have spoken on Election
Night, they have already designated a de facto President
elect and Vice President elect. And if-any time after the
election-the. de facto President elect dies, the de facto Vice.
President elect should be in line for Inauguration as would
the de jure Vice President elect after the death of the de
jure President elect under the Twentieth Amendment, or
the Vice President after the death of the President under
Article II and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
So much for my basic constitutional and commonsensi-
cal intuition which, I hope, is widely shared. Now for the
seemingly counterintuitive insight: we can often most easily
accomplish our intuitive goal, and approximate the clear
post-Inauguration succession scheme by the seemingly
counterintuitive practice of voting for and counting the
votes for a candidate who is already dead. Actually, the idea
is really not so counterintuitive once we stop and think
about it. When a President elect dies one day before Inau-
guration, Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment in effect
says, "act as if a dead man can be sworn in, and one na-
nosecond after this fictional swearing in, the Vice President
will become President under Article IL"
Though it might seem counterintuitive to swear in a
dead man, the goal is a kind of constitutional cy-pres,
achieving the purposes of the post-Inauguration succession
rules under Article II and the 1\venty-Fifth Amendment
And I propose that we carry the TWentieth Amendment's·
insight backward in time, throughout the entire period be..:·
tween Election Day and Inauguration Day. Just as. the
, .
J', .• ' - ..
18. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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Twentieth Amendment in effeGt tells us to swear in the
dead man as if alive, and then follow Article II and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, so I suggest that electoral col-
lege members vote for, and that members of Congress
count the votes for, a dead man as if alive, and then follow
the ordinary succession rules on Inauguration Day, al-
lowing the Vice President to become President.
To further test our constitutional and commonsensical
intuition, and see how the proposed legislation would
achieve its intended goal, let us consider various untimely
deaths in different periods, working backwards
chronologically.
A. Post-Inauguration Period
Let us begin with the Post-Inauguration Period. Sup-
pose that, any time after being sworn in, President Smith
dies. The clear rules of Article II and the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment go into effect here, as described earlier. Vice
President Jones becomes President, and Jones handpicks a
would-be successor, Green, as Vice President, subject to
democratic approval. If, instead, Vice President Jones dies
in this period while President Smith is alive, then President
Smith will pick a new would-be successor (Brown). If, God
forbid, both Smith and Jones die together, then congres-
sional legislation-the Presidential Succession Act-kicks
in and provides the rules of succession, pursuant to the ex-
plicit invitation of Article II.
B. Formal President Elect Period
Now consider the fortnight immediately before Inau-
guration, but after the Congress has officially counted the
electoral college votes and certified a President elect and
Vice President elect. Let us call this the Formal President
Elect Period. If President elect Smith dies in this period,
then-as we have seen-Vice President elect Jones will be-
come President on Inauguration Day, pursuant to the
Twentieth Amendment, and will then have a right to pick a
would-be successor as Vice President, under the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment. If, instead, Jones dies instead of Smith
dudng this period, Smith will take office as President on
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Inauguration Day and fill the vacancy left by Jones'
death-here too, under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. If,
God forbid, both President elect Smith and Vice President
elect Jones die together, once again congressional legisla-
tion under the Presidential Succession Act kicks in and pro-
vides the rules of succession.
C. Informal President Elect Period
Next, consider the 'immediately preceding three week
period, after the electoral college has voted, giving a clear
majority to Smith and Jones for President and Vice Presi-
dent, respectively, but before these electoral votes have
been formally counted in Congress. Let us call this the In-
formal President Elect Period. If Smith dies in this period,
what will happen? Will Congress count his electoral college
votes? Today, genuine uncertainty reigns, and a Congress
controlled by the party that lost in November might try to
invoke the Greeley precedent as a principled basis for not
counting Smith's votes. If Congress were to treat a vote for
Smith as a blank vote, then no candidate would have a ma-
jority of all electoral votes cast. The contest might then be
decided under the Twelfth Amendment with the obvious
victor being Candidate Black-who 'fan for President and
lost in November, but who now has more Presidential elec-
toral college votes than any other now living person-who
indeed, might be the only living person with any Presiden-
tial electoral votes. The legitimacy crisis that could arise
here is obvious. Leaders of the Smith-Jones party will cry
foul and try to wrap themselves in the legislative history of
the Twentieth Amendment, while leaders of Black's party
will piously point to Greeley, pronounce the text of the
Twentieth Amendment ambiguous, and indignantly declare
that Black, after all, received more of a Presidential man-
date than anyone else-surely, they will say, more than
Jones, whom no one in November voted for as President.19
19. Elsewhere, Vik Amar and I have suggested ways to improve the mandate
that a Vice President receives on Election Day, by allowing voters to vote separately
for President and Vice President and even (if they choose) split their ticket. See
Amar & Amar, supra note 1. My argument today in no way requires acceptance of
that more provocative separate ballot proposal. Indeed, for simplicity, all the exam-
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Interest groups, pundits, and the media will predictably di-
vide into warring camps, and confusion and cynicism will
reign among the citizenry.
But note how the proposed legislation will avoid a fu-
ture legitimacy crisis. Long before the unhappy death sce-
nario arose, Congress would have addressed the issue with
precise, nonpartisan legislation, passed in a calm, deliberate
manner behind a kind of "veil of ignorance," proclaiming
that a vote for Smith will be counted, whether Smith be a
Republican or Democrat, and regardless of which party
controls the Congress.
Spoilsports might argue that, strictly speaking, any leg-
islation passed today could not conclusively bind a future
result-oriented Congress, which would be free to replace
the earlier law after Smith's death but before the official
vote counting in Congress. (One Congress cannot generally
bind a successor Congress.) And worrywarts might fret
over whether our proposed legislation should be enacted as
a law rather than a joint or concurrent resolution, since it
seeks to regulate how votes will be counted in Congress it-
self. (Sections 15 through 18 of Title 3, however, do pro-
vide a clear precedent for regulating congressional vote-
counting by law.)
The spoilsports and worrywarts largely miss the point.
The key function of our proposed legislation is to serve as a
precommitment and focal point. With our proposed legisla-
tion on the books, it will be much more difficult, politically,
for a future result-oriented Congress to change the rules
and discount the votes for Smith. The principled precedent
will be our legislation, not the Greeley affair. Citizens, pun-
dits, reporters, and politicians will be able to point to the
plain language, in black and white, in the United States
Code, answering the question of the hour. Any deviation
from this clear focal point will obviously smack of changing
the rules in the middle of the game-indeed, after the game
has ended.
pIes in today's essay assume unified tickets (though allowing ticket-splitting between
Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates would not, I believe, fundamentally
change my analysis or conclusions today).
HeinOnline -- 48 Ark. L. Rev.  228 1995
228 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:215
With our proposed legislation in place, what result?
Congress will count votes for the now-dead Smith, who will
thus become, formally, the "President elect." Jones will be
the Vice President elect, and she will be sworn in as Presi-
dent on Inauguration Day under the clear rules of the
1\ventieth Amendment. Soon thereafter, she will name a
new Vice President, subject to democratic approval under
Section 2 of the 1\venty-Fifth Amendment. This result is
exactly the same as would have occurred if Smith had died
after the formal vote-counting in Congress, or after Inaugu-
ration Day. And that is exactly as it should be-the precise
hour of death is largely arbitrary and should not affect suc-
cession. (Remember, this, after all, is the constitutional and
commonsensical intuition driving our proposed legislation.)
So too, if instead of Smith, Jones died in the Informal
President Elect Period, Jones' electoral votes would be
counted; she would become the formal Vice President elect.
After Inauguration, President Smith then would fill the va-
cancy in the Vice Presidency under the 1\venty-Fifth
Amendment. And if, God forbid, both Smith and Jones
were to die together in this period, their electoral votes
would be counted, and on Inauguration Day, congressional
legislation under the Presidential Succession Act would
kick in to determine who shall be sworn in as President.
Once again these results are-by design-exactly the same
as would occur if the deaths had occurred a few weeks later,
after congressional vote-counting, or Inauguration.
D. De Facto Popular President Elect Period
Now let us consider what I shall call the de facto Popu-
lar President Elect Period-the five weeks after Election
Day but before the meeting of the electoral college. Sup-
pose Smith-proclaimed by all as the "next President" on
Election Night-dies during this period. What is a faithful
elector to do? As I have discussed earlier, it is far from'
clear what she would or should do with the current regime'·
in place.
But see how our proposed legislation will show her the.
way. Her uncertainty in our earlier discussion was larg~ly:;
due to confusion and uncoordination. She is confused over _
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whether a vote for Smith will be counted by Congress, or
will be, in effect, a wasted (or even perverse) vote if Con-
gress follows the Greeley precedent.20 And she may not be
able to coordinate strategy with like-minded electors spread
across the continent, all of whom had planned/promised on
Election Night to support the Smith/Jones ticket. By pro-
viding a precommitment and focal point, our proposed legis-
lation solves her confusion problem. Congress has
promised that a vote for Smith will count-and any repudi-
ation of that promise would be a very politically costly
breach of faith. By providing an obvious example in black
and white in a simple sentence in the United States Code,
Congress will focus our informed elector's mind on the ob-
vious (though at first, perhaps counterintuitive) good sense
of acting as if Smith were still alive.
In counting votes, Congress performs in effect a minis-
terial function, registering the will of the voters in the elec-
toral college. But these electoral voters, in turn, play a
largely ministerial role today, registering the will of the real
voters on Election Day. By promising in its law to count
votes for Smith, Congress in effect would be encouraging
the electors to count the citizenry's vote for Smith on Elec-
tion Day.
But why not do more than "encourage" our faithful
elector to vote for Smith? Why not somehow require her
by law to do so? To begin with, no legislative requirement
seems necessary here. By hypothesis our faithful elector
was planning to vote for the Smith/Jones ticket before
Smith died. Politically, she pledged to her fellow citizens
that she would support that ticket. In today's political cul-
ture, an elector typically sees herself as someone who car-
ries out the state electorate's will, as expressed on Election
Day. On Election Day, the citizens voted for the Smith/
Jones ticket-for Smith as President, and Jones as Presi-
dent if Smith should die. To the extent they thought about
it, few voters, I suspect, would think that things should be
20. The legislative history of the 1\ventieth Amendment is no help here; in-
deed, it pointedly leaves open the vitality of the Greeley precedent, implying that
Congress perhaps should not count any electoral college vote for a candidate already
dead ,before the electoral college meeting. See H.R. REP. No. 345, supra note 3, at 5.
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any different if Smith died before or after Inauguration, or
before or after the Electoral College has met. De facto, the
real election has already occurred, and after Election Night,
Smith and Jones are-de facto, and for all practical pur-
poses-the President elect and Vice President elect. In
popular consciousness, the steps that follow-electoral col-
lege meetings, vote countings, swearings in-are largely
ceremonial. Most faithful electors, I believe, recognize all
this and would happily vote for Smith, once assured that
this vote will indeed be counted.
So, no real congressional "mandate" for electors seems
needed. Nor, I believe, would a congressional mandate be
easily squared with the Constitution. The Constitution
plainly contemplates that, at least formally, the electors
must themselves decide upon their votes. Notwithstanding
some language in Ray v. Blair,21 I myself have real doubts
about state laws that attempt to force electors to take le-
gally binding pledges as a condition of November ballot ac-
cess. But even if a legal pledge can be required, it is far
from clear that any legal sanction could be imposed in the
event of a subsequent violation of that pledge. Even if the
faithless elector could be punished, it is further dubious that
her faithless vote is somehow void. In any event, even if
states could regulate their own electors, I find it hard to see
where Congress would have the authority to bind electors
by law.
Happily, no binding is necessary; our proposed legisla-
tion should do the trick. Our faithful elector, once she un-
derstands the situation, could vote for the Smith/Jones
ticket, as she had planned and politically pledged, and so
could her fellow faithful electors in other states. Congress.
will count the votes for Smith, per its precommitment, and
Jones will become President on Inauguration Day and
name her successor under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Once again-and by design-our proposed legislation wiU
21. See supra note 7. In earlier work, Vik Amar and I may have read Blair too
broadly. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 943 n.86. Contrary to the loose Ian: '.
guage in that passing footnote, I now do not think that Ray "strongly suggests that
states can bind collegians any way they choose." ,
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mean that the accidental timing of a death will not change
the succession results.22
But what about the problem created not by confusion
but by the difficulty of coordination? All that is needed to
cure that problem is a congressional statute-passed under
the clear authority of Article II23-that modifies the day on
which the electoral college shall meet, in the event of an
unexpected death or incapacity (as certified, by, say, the
, Chief Justice of the United States24) in order to allow, say,
one week for electors to absorb the situation.
One variant of this scenario is also imaginable. Jones
might well communicate with her electors, and she might
try to instruct them to vote for Jones for President, and for
Green-her newly announced handpicked successor-for
Vice President. 1\vo reasons might underlie Jones' pro-
posed rough justice substitution. First, Green would not
need to be confirmed after Inauguration under the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment and could hit the ground running on Jan-
uary 20. Second, and related, on the off chance that some-
22, But what if party bosses tried to order electors to vote for the bosses' favor-
ite candidate King, rather than Smith, in a naked attempt to muscle out Jones? As a
realistic matter this seems unlikely, as Jones will be, after Smith's death, the de facto
"leader of the party" in most scenarios, and the one with the most obvious mandate
from the People on Election Day. (For suggestions how to strengthen that mandate,
see generally Amar & Amar, supra note 1.) If, however, electoral-collegian "tam-
pering" by party bosses were seen as a problem, perhaps Congress could prohibit-
either directly, or through conditional funding rules for any party that seeks federal
election funds-any direct effort to lobby electors between Election Day and Elec-
toral College Meeting Day by anyone other than the candidates themselves, or their
direct agents. (Especially in a death scenario, the surviving running mate must be
free to consult his/her electors, for reasons explained infra.) Congressional power
here is plausibly supported by the clear role Congres,s may play under Article II in
providing for the dates on which electors are chosen, and meet; and by analogy to
"electioneering" rules protecting ordinary citizens from being lobbied immediately
prior to casting their votes.
The "anti-lobbying" law sketched in this footnote is, of course, wholly severable
and distinct from my main legislative proposal.
23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 ("The Congress may determine the Time of
Choosing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their votes; which Day
shall be the same throughout the United States."). The legislative history of the
1\ventieth Amendment explicitly invites Congressional legislation postponing the
electoral.college meeting in the event of a death after Election Day but before the
regularly scheduled meeting of the electoral college. See H.R. REP. No. 345, supra
note'3"at 5.
24. See supra note 16.
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thing were to happen to Jones in the weeks ahead, the
Smith/Jones party-which, after all, won in November-
would be assured that the party would control the Oval Of-
fice. If instead, the rules of succession under Congress's
Presidential Succession Act were to kick in, Black's party,
which lost the election, might be able to win through death
what it lost at the polls.
But this Jones-for-President scenario is imaginable pre-
cisely because it, too, does rough justice, and plausibly im-
plements the people's mandate in November. Once again,
Jones will be President, barring future tragedy; in the event
of tragedy, she will be' replaced by Green-her handpicked
successor, democratically approved. This outcome is, in ef-
fect, what the people voted for in November, and what they
would have gotten had Smith died the day after Inaugura-
tion-with one small difference. The forum of democratic
approval of Jones' would-be successor has shifted from the
Congress under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the electo-
ral college in our scenario. But this should not trouble us,
for the electors, too, were democratically chosen-chosen,
indeed, for the very purpose of voting for President and
Vice President. Although typically mere ciphers recording
the citizenry's verdict on Election Day, the vestigial body of
the electoral college does, it seems, have a mandate to deal
with a genuine emergency that the citizenry could not and
did not address, an emergency that arises after Election
Day. If the electoral college has any function at all today, it
is precisely to deal with the case at hand as a proxy for the
people.
What would happen if, instead of Smith, Jones dies af-
ter Election Day but before the electoral college meets?
With our proposed legislation in place, electoral collegians
who had planned and politically pledged to Smith/Jones
could continue to vote for Jones, secure in the knowledge
that Congress would count this vote; that Jones would thus
become the formal Vice President elect; and that after In:-
auguration, President Smith would fill the vacancy in·.the
Vice Presidency, subject to democratic approval, under the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Alternatively Smith may.,com-
municate with his electors and instruct them to vote for his
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newly-announced handpicked successor, Brown. Once
again, this substitution seems unproblematic, approximat-
ing the results that would have occurred had Jones died af-
ter Inauguration, with only a small change in the
mechanism of democratic approval for Smith's handpicked
successor.
But what if, God forbid, both Smith and Jones die after
Election Day, and before either of them has had any chance
to name a would-be successor? Several scenarios might un-
fold. None is particularly happy, but there are no happy
choices here. Though these scenarios yield different out-
comes, none seems in principle wrong, since it is hard to see
which choice is clearly right. The people's will on Election
Day-to elect Smith, and (if not Smith) Jones, and (if not
one of them) someone they handpick, subject to democratic
approval-cannot be carried out, and so some democratic
body must improvise.
In one scenario electoral college majorities might con-
tinue to vote for Smith and Jones. With our proposed legis-
lation in place, these votes will be counted; Smith and Jones
formally will become President elect and Vice President
elect; and on Inauguration Day, the succession rules of the
Presidential Succession Act will kick in and determine who
shall be sworn in as President. This result is the same as
would occur if Smith and Jones had died one day after the
electoral college met, or one day after Inauguration.
Alternatively, the leaders of Smith's and Jones' party
might try to get in the act, designate substitute candidates,
and inform electors who had pledged and planned to vote
for Smith/Jones that they should instead vote for the new
substitute ticket. If electors-typically party regulars-fol-
low the marching orders of party bosses, then the substitute
ticket will receive an electoral college majority and take of-
fice on Inauguration Day. The outcome is different from
the one that would occur if the rules of the Presidential Suc-
cession Act kicked in, but-once again-it is hard to see
how,this difference would create any legitimacy crisis. The
electors have at least as much of a democratic mandate to
improvise in this unprovided-for case as does Congress.
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Instead, suppose some electors follow the party bosses'
marching orders, and others do not, voting for Smith/Jones,
or for their own substitute candidates. In this case, no can-
didate may have a majority of electoral votes, and the con-
test might be thrown into the House and Senate for
resolution under the Twelfth Amendment (with Section 4
of the Twentieth Amendment also possibly coming into
play). The result under this scenario would likely differ
from both the Presidential Succession Act outcome and the
party bosses' marching orders scenario-but once again, it
is hard to say that anyone of these procedures is privileged,
on democratic or constitutional theory grounds, over the
others.
In short, our proposed legislation does not solve this
truly unprovided-for case of double death, but it at least
does not make the problem any worse. Can we do any bet-
ter than this? Possibly, if we are willing to be imaginative.
Here is one, perhaps farfetched, supplemental suggestion,
which, I hasten to add, is wholly severable from my main
legislative proposal. Congress could provide by a statute
passed now-well before any crisis-that if, in the month
before the electoral college has met, both the de facto Presi-
dent elect and the de facto Vice President elect die or be-
come incapacitated (as certified by, say, the Chief Justice of
the United States25) the date of the meeting of the electoral
college shall be postponed and shall not occur until four
weeks after certification. In the interim, the United States
Census Bureau shall administer a wholly nonbinding "Pres-
idential/Vice Presidential Preference Poll," for purely in-
formative purposes, and for whatever political weight the
electoral college members choose to attach to it. The poll
would look like a ballot and be administered like an elec-
tion, by the Census Bureau. Federal and state force and
fraud rules in effect for ordinary elections would apply,
under the terms of this supplemental statute, and eligibility·
to participate in this poll would be governed by the same
rules as applied in the earlier November election. The can-
didates listed on this informal "ballot" would be exactly the
25. See supra note 16.
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same as in the earlier November· election-with one key
difference. Party leaders of the party represented by (the
now dead or incapacitated) Smith and Jones would be au-
thorized to designate substitute candidates. The Census
Bureau would be responsible for certifying the results of
this poll, state by state.
The results of this "poll," it must be stressed, would
have no binding legal effect. It would be purely advisory
with whatever weight members of the electoral college
chose to give it. Though "extralegal," it is not illegal or un-
constitutional. Nor is it objectionable on democratic theory
grounds, for its purpose is to elicit more information from
the people in light of the clear frustration of the will, ex-
pressed on Election Day, that Smith or Jones or someone
named by them should occupy the Oval Office for the next
four years.
Nor is our imaginative supplemental legislation wholly
unprecedented. The main binding legal effect of this law-
postponement of the meeting of the electoral college-is
clearly permitted under the language of Article II, which
explicitly declares that "Congress may determine . . . the
Day on which [the electoral college] shall give their votes."
Furthermore, the Presidential poll itself is really not that
different from the November election itself-an "extracon-
stitutional," but hardly unconstitutional, product of state
legislatures delegating to the people the power to choose
presidential electors who politically pledge to vote for cer-
tain candidates. Nor is it very different from systems devel-
oped in states prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, in
which popular beauty contest elections for United States
senator were held to provide information about the popular
will to the state legislatures that formally elected the
senators.
The biggest problem with our imaginative supplemen-
tal legislation is a practical one of timing. The results of the
electoral college might not be known until mid-January,
with formal Congressional vote counting taking place, say,
two days later. There would be virtually no time for an or-
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derly transition of administration.26 But perhaps an awk-
ward honeymoon is better than a bad marriage; three
bumbling months with the right people in the White
House-with a popular mandate to govern-may be much
better than four years of the wrong folks in office, selected
by the vagaries of the Presidential Succession Act or one of
its equally imperfect counterpart mechanisms.27
E. General Election Period
Let us, finally, turn to the period before the people
have spoken on Election Day in November. If major party
candidate Smith dies after his party's nomination, but
before the election, the current regime could lead to confu-
sion and chaos-especially if the death occurs right before
Election Day. Unlike the situations we have already can-
vassed, there is no de facto President elect in this scenario;
the people have not yet spoken on Election Night. And
they are, I believe, entitled to speak clearly, with explicit
options laid out before them on a ballot and clearly defined
by a general election campaign.
The best solution here, I suggest, is that the election be
postponed for up to four weeks. (If the death occurs more
than four weeks before the regularly scheduled Election
Day, no postponement need occur.) Congress should pro-
vide now-well before any future crisis-that if, in the four
week period prior to Election Day, a major party Presiden-
tial or Vice Presidential candidate dies or becomes incapac-
itated, as certified by, say, the Chief Justice,28 no electors
shall be chosen until four weeks have elapsed after
certification.
The proposal is limited to major party candidates,
which could easily be defined as parties or candidates that
polled more than ten percent in the previous Presidential
contest, or that presented more than a certain number of
26. January 20 is established in the Constitution as Inauguration Day. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XX, § 1. Thus, this date is a fixed landmark, short of constitutional
amendment. '
27. For an alternative solution to the problem of "four years of the wrong folks
in office" see infra note 30. '.' .
28. See supra note 16.
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petitions in the current election year prior to Labor Day.
(This last provision avoids entrenching the existing two ma-
jor parties.) In this four week period, the dead or incapaci-
tated .candidate could be replaced, and the American
people on Election Day would have a complete menu of
choices, defined by a focussed campaign.
Congressional power to enact this proposal clearly de-
rives from Article II, which authorizes Congress to "deter-
mine the Time of choosing the Electors"-as Congress now
does in 3 U.S.c. § 3, establishing the familiar November
Thesday Election Day.29 (Congress would also need to de-
cide whether other elections-for Congress, etcetera-
should also be postponed or, instead, whether those should
take place as scheduled, with a special, President-only elec-
tion held later.) .
Once again, the biggest problem here is that the win-
dow for smooth transitions of power shrinks under this pro-
posed legislation, from ten weeks to as few as six weeks in
the event of an untimely candidate death. But better a
bumpy transition than a muddled mandate.3D Election
29. Here, too, cf supra note 23, the legislative history of the 1\ventieth Amend-
ment explicitly invites "Congress by general statute" to "postpone the day of the
election" in a death scenario. See H.R. REP. No. 345, supra note 3, at 5.
30. The desirability of a President with a mandate to govern might also suggest
that the general rules of succession under the Presidential Succession Act be recon-
sidered. Under Article II, the Congress may, by law, provide for the case of post-
Inauguration double death in the White House by "declaring what Officer shall then
act as President" until "a President shall be elected." Could not Congress provide
for a special Presidential election to be conducted three months after the double
death, to fill out the remainder of the four-year term? Under this model, the
Speaker of the House (or whoever is next in line) would serve as a caretaker acting
President only long enough for the American people to be consulted again, to desig-
nate a real President for the remainder of the term. (Of course, nothing would pre-
vent the acting caretaker from running in this election; and if he or she were to.win,
s/he would have a more genuine mandate to fill the Oval Office and lead the
country.)
In fact, in 1792, the Second Congress enacted the first presidential succession
law. It provided that "if a double vacancy occurred when more than six months ·of a
presidential term remained, the contingent successor would act as president only
until a new president (and vice president) were chosen in a special election, con-
ducted under the electoral college method ...." Allan P. Sindler, Presidential Selec-
tion an.d Succession in Special Situations, in PRESIDENTIAL SELECfION 331, 334
(Alexander Heard & Michael Nelson eds., 1987). In 1886, the law was modified to
give Congress discretion "to decide whether and when to call a special election." Id.
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Days are awesome moments in a well-functioning democ-
racy, and deserve to be done right.
at 345. Not until 1947 did Congress, over President Truman's objection, eliminate
the special election device. Id. at 335.
The proposal to modify the general rules of the Presidential Succession Act is,
of course, wholly severable from the other proposals in this essay.
(Also severable, but related, would be legislation designed to fill a gap left open
by the 1\venty-Fifth Amendment, specifying the procedures under which' a Vice
President temporarily serving as Acting President could be determined disabled~
i.e., unable to discharge the powers and duties of Acting President. See id. at 359:)
